Militants affiliated with al-Qaida have taken nominal control of parts of Anbar over the past week including the cities of Fallujah and Ramai.

Meanwhile in Syria, a rebel group with close ties to al-Qaida, the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS), is embroiled in inter-rebel violence that has spread from the north of the country to the eastern city of Raqqa, once an al-Qaida stronghold.

Syria Deeply spoke to Ayham Kamel of the Eurasia group about the roots of the current violence in Anbar and what links it to the conflict in neighboring Syria.

Syria Deeply:How does the violence in Iraq’s Anbar province relate to Syria? Are these two separate conflicts that merely influence one another, or are Syria and Iraq two fronts of the same war?

Ayham Kamel: I think the long-term strategy for the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham [greater Syria] has always been to create a unified theater of operations, to operate across the Levant area and exploit security vacuums to their advantage. Iraq was always part of that strategy. Al-Qaida was willing and able to shift resources and it was part of its planning to do so when the opportunity presented itself.

[Al-Qaida] has [prepared to fight in Iraq] not over weeks but months, by building camps, establishing supply routes, doing all of that … between western Iraq and eastern Syria where where a government presence is almost nonexistent. So I think that the security vacuum and the civil war in Syria have provided ISIS or al-Qaida with that opportunity to exploit the region between western Iraq and eastern Syria to build a more stable basis there.

SD: Is it a coincidence that we’re seeing some Syrian rebel groups fight back against ISIS at the same time that we’re seeing al-Qaida assert itself in Anbar?

AK:I think there are correlations here, there are issues that are in common. One thing is that al-Qaida cannot commit all resources to one conflict. Its effort to shift resources will have a cost on its operations in one country.

We’ve seen a revolt against ISIS in Syria, partly because the group has relocated some of its fighters to Iraq. So definitely any shift in resources will affect operations or the balance in the military conflict there.

I do not see ISIS being eradicated [in Syria] simply because when the opportunity presents itself al-Qaida still has the most capable fighters that can actually return to Syria and take advantage of the conflict there. In the meantime I think Iraq is the right opportunity and the right battlefield for al-Qaida, but that’s not necessarily a long-term policy.

SD:What lies at the heart of the unrest in Anbar? How was al-Qaida able to begin operating there again?

AK:[It’s] definitely al-Qaida exploiting the deteriorating relationship between the central government in Baghdad and the Sunni community at large. Maliki’s policies have not particularly been … lets say constructive … with the Sunni community. Al-Qaida saw that as an opportunity and is exploiting it very successfully.

What will happen … I think that part of the Sunni community will commit to armed violence against the central government, not a majority [of the Sunni community] in any way, but a part that is significant enough to bolster al-Qaida or bolster al-Qaida’s operations.

This is a rise of a more limited insurgency in Iraq, one that will begin in Anbar. It doesn’t threaten the political order, but it definitely undermines the government. It undermines the image of the government and broadens and intensifies the al-Qaida threat in the region.

SD:What does it mean that the Iraqi government lost control of Fallujah and Ramadi? I understand Anbar province has been isolated from the central Iraqi government for some time now.

AK:The security presence in Anbar has always been weaker than other provinces in Iraq. That’s been partly because the military doesn’t have significant resources to fully control these ares and [the military] has also been [employing] a strategy to empower the local elements: the Iraqi security forces.

Particularly in Ramadi and Fallujah, in most Anbar cities, [local security forces have] been more welcome than the Iraqi military, so i think the strategy here is both a function of the limitations of the Iraqi government and also an effort [on the part of the government] not to create more sectarian tensions.

Loosing control of the cities is indicative not only of the limited nature of the security presence [in Anbar], but also of Al-Qaida’s power. Taking over cities is not a simple operation, this is a planned one, and it requires active participation from a large number of fighters to take over government facilities, installations, important strategic parts of the city. It also says that part of the Sunni community is cooperating with al-Qaida or at least turning a blind eye in that battle to weaken the central government.